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THE FORMATION OF LAW: THE INTERRELATION
OF DECISION AND STATUTE
CHARLES S. DESMOND*
INTRODUCTION

believe that legislamany lawyers (not including this writer)
A GOOD
tion usually changes the law for the worse. There is a respectable
historical background for this vague feeling of American lawyers and
judges that courts, not legislatures, should make the law. Most lawyers
have been trained in the idea that the decisions of the appellate courts
are the essence of the law in this country. This idea, in turn, is based
on the fact that in the first half-century or more of our national existence
the courts carried most of the task of formulating the law. The judges
were technicians and specialists, better trained for their jobs than the
new citizen legislators. The legislators were busy setting up a viable
government. So the judges took the opportunity to build up by adaptation and invention a body of common law, partly new, partly old, partly
modified. The major activity of the legislatures in this field came later,
and it consisted mostly of the development of new fields of law, leaving
largely untouched the prior work of the courts in the ancient areas. Still
later there arrived on the scene the omnipresent administrative bodies.
Today, it would seem, the amount of direct judicial law-making by decision is quantitatively small, in relation to our size and population. The
five principal appellate courts of New York (the Court of Appeals and
the four appellate divisions) decide together only about three thousand
cases a year. Most of those are handed down without formal or lengthy
opinions and so produce no definite statements of generally applicable
law. Many are fact determinations. Many more deal with procedural
matters, or with highly specialized, unique situations. The residuum of
important common-law pronouncements or broadly applicable statutory
analyses is small indeed. New York courts, unlike, for instance, the
Supreme Court of Canada, are not empowered to give advisory opinions.
So the courts, unlike the legislatures, must sit back and wait for business
in the form of litigated cases. And, in conformity with strong tradition,
the courts are seemingly slow to change long standing rules, particularly
So the court-made changes in the law
when property rights are at stake.'
2are relatively few and gradual.
* Associate Judge, New York Court of Appeals.
1. See Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925); Cardozo, A Ministry of
Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114-15 (1921).
2. For an extreme example of reluctance, see People v. Morton, 303 N.Y. 96, 93, 123
N.E.2d 790, 791 (1954).
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JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

With the increasing frequency of the exercise of legislative power, the
courts have "made" less law on their own initiative. Instead, they have
been busy construing, applying and interpreting statutes. In such a situation, it is inevitable that the charge of "judicial legislation" is levelled at
the courts.
At rare times the accusation is proper. At other times the charge is an
exercise of a losing lawyer's ancient privilege of "cussing out" the court.
A judge may fairly be accused of "judicially legislating" when he reads
into a statute something that is not expressly or impliedly present, or
when he deletes something that is. In so doing, the judge usurps legislative power, for the power directly to enact laws, that is, to declare
prospectively what the law is hereafter to be, is a legislative function.
The judge's power, on the other hand, is to adjudicate the rights of
citizens in adversary proceedings, and, in so doing, to construe and apply
the law.3 Putting it another way, the primary job of a court is to dispose
of particular, actual disputes by applying the law to the immediate facts.
Thus, it would appear that true "judicial legislation" means one of two
things: either a distortion by the courts of legislative language ("literary
free wheeling," says Justice Frankfurter) 4 or, arrogation by the courts of
the exclusive power of the legislature to act in certain areas of lawmaking. The second version of the indictment is, significantly, expressed
most often in intramural contests within the courts themselves," but the
charge in such context is not really one of usurpation or encroachment
on the legislative domain. Rather, it is merely a statement by dissenters
that a certain subject matter should be left to legislative treatment.
In any other sense, it is almost meaningless to accuse judges of misfeasance when they tinker with the common law to bring it up to date.
Since the common law is wholly "unwritten," non-legislative and noncodified, and since its great merit is its adaptability and elasticity, it
would forfeit its prime argument for existence and continuation if the
courts refused to review and revise it, when necessary. Stare decisis
"embodies an important social policy" but it is "not a mechanical
formula."' When and if the courts are too hesitant about making the
necessary changes, the legislature can and does step in.7 Judge Lehman
dealt adequately with this idea in the Sears, Roebuck case: 8
3. See Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. R. 477, 492 (N.Y. 1811).
4. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 43 (1948).
'5. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
6. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
7. See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936), which spurred the amendment in 1937 of the N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57.
8. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 9 Avenue-31 Street Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d 20 (1937).
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"True, inconsistent decisions rendered in disregard of the principle of stare decisis
tend to make the law uncertain and unstable. A final appellate court may hesitate to
disregard a precedenL It is free to do so when convinced that its earlier determination is unsound. Though, in such case, we speak of overruling a previous decision,
that is a figure of speech which is not entirely accurate. We cannot destroy or
diminish the legal effect of the earlier decision. It remains as between the parties a
conclusive determination of the questions both of law and fact there litigated. We
can refuse to follow it as a precedent when in litigation between other parties similar
questions of law are presented. Thus a decision of this court overruling a previous
decision is not, at least in theory, a retrospective change of the law; it is merely a
reformulation of the general rules of law which we deem applicable in a particular
situation." 9

Simplifying our proposition even more, we may say that the legislature makes the law and the courts apply it. The policy of the state, "the
public will," is expressed in statutes, and it is the duty of the court to
apply those statutes, case by case, as they arise. In theory, the judge
need only examine a statute, ascertain the legislature's intent and
purpose as expressed in the statute's language, and then apply it to the
facts disclosed in the pending lawsuit. However, all of the foregoing
truisms conceded, our progress in the analysis of this problem is not
advanced, for it is one thing to mouth a rule of law and another to have
it survive in application.
THE INTERPLAY OF DECISION AND STATUTE

Professor Brogan, in his brilliant and entertaining Politicsin America,0
says that "the judicial organization of the United States is the institution which a stranger has the greatest difficulty in understanding."' 1
Primarily, Professor Brogan's difficulty is with the unique power of
American courts to strike down legislation as unconstitutional. But,
beyond that, even as perceptive a student of our governmental institutions as he found it hard to discern the lines between executive, legislative and judicial power. In the power of the courts over legislation
DeTocqueville discovered "immense political influence."' 2 But actually,
as we shall show, the legislative and judicial powers rarely come into
violent collision. At least in New York State, their mutual relations are
distinguished by forbearance and accommodation. As far as I can recall,
charges of usurpation are unknown in this state, and such encroachment
as does occur is unintentional. The New York legislature and the New
York courts are, busily and concurrently, "making law" and frequently
overruling each other in the process. But, for all the seeming lack of
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 400-01, 9 N.E.2d at 26.
Brogan, Politics in America (1954).
Id. at 388.
1 DeTocquevlle, Democracy in America 98, 100 (rev. ed. 19C0).
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symmetry, efficiency, or logic, for all the waste and repetitive motion,
the dual system of law-making actually works.
This complexity is an inevitable consequence of the American and
British bifurcation of law, statutory and common. Statutes are the
solemn (if not always definite) written declarations of the public will,
formally adopted by legislatures. The common, or "unwritten" law
is, on the other hand, traditional, rather than the product of precise enactment. It is a system (rather than a code) of more or less flexible and
adaptable rules derived from natural law and the innate sense of public
justice, exhibiting the traditional sense of the community as to the appropriate rules of conduct for an organized society. Vague and formless
though it seems, the common law is, nevertheless, as much a part of the
local body of law as is any statute. The legislature can, in most instances,
modify and revise it, 3 and so can the courts.14 Moreover, the courts may
act when the legislature has failed or refused to do so.'" Into some of the
largest and most controversial fields of law, such as torts, the legislature
has hardly moved at all. In other equally basic departments, such as the
law of real property and of crimes, the common or court-made law peacefully co-exists with numerous statutes and with them effects a beneficial
union. As to legislatively invented remedies, such as workmen's compensation, the statutes are comprehensive, detailed codes, but even in
these areas the innumerable separate fact situations call frequently for
court interposition by way of construction and application of minutely
detailed statutes to fragmented or borderline combinations of facts. After
thousands of years, the Ten Commandments-simple, terse mandates
that they are-still keep theologians and moralists busy construing and
applying.
Very few statutes intended for wide use and control can specify each
fact or group of facts on which they may impinge. For example, when
the New York legislature expressed its will that every "factory" should
be subject to inspection and to safety rules,' it had to choose whether
to name every sort of establishment or operation it wanted to include in
"factory" or to use the common, generic term with a minimum of definition, and let the administrators, subject to court review, deal with the
single instances. If the legislature had taken the alternative course of
classifying as "factory" or "not factory" every kind of establishment it
13.

Markey v. County of Queens, 154 N.Y. 675, 682, 49 N.E. 71, 73 (1898); Bertles v.

Nunan, 92 N.Y. 152 (1883).
14. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 379 (1933); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,

354, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951); Rumsey v. New York & N.E.R.R., 133 N.Y. 79, 85, 30
N.E. 654, 655 (1892).
15. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1933).

16.

N.Y. Labor Law § 2(9).
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could think of, some of them would inevitably have been omitted from
either category. The administrators thought that an apple-sorting, applecleaning business was a factory, and so did the courts. 17 The courts'
choice in calling the plant a "factory" was, we will suppose, "judicial
legislation," but while the courts had a choice of answers they bad no
right to refuse to answer. The state legislature, when the court's decision
came to its attention, decided that it had not intended to include among
"factories" places like the cannery, or, more exactly the legislature concluded that if it had thought about apple-cleaning, it would not have
listed it as a "factory" operation. So the legislature "reversed" the courts
by means of an appropriate statutory amendment., This was not usurpation by either branch of government but step-by-step development
of a complicated and extensive rule.
TE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
In official Albany it is established practice to relieve the tedium of
long days with anecdotes about the elusiveness and illusoriness of 'qegislative intent" and many a mot has been coined in such exchanges. One
of the best is the tale oft-told by an experienced legislator. The story is
of a citizen, more zealous than practical, who haunted the offices of the
leaders in an effort to persuade them to pass her very special, private bill.
Finally, legislative patience wore so thin that arrangements were made to
get rid of the bill (and the citizen) by enacting it. But the real and wellknown, although nowhere written, "intent" was to send the bill to the
governor's office in the confident expectation that it would be promptly
vetoed by the chief executive. It was. No amount of library research
could have discovered that particular "legislative intent."
Of course, it is the first meaning of "judicial legislation" which is used
most often, most seriously, and with most apparent basis. The courts in
their daily work simply must construe and apply statutes, otherwise they
would have to ignore them in every instance where the literal statutory
language does not automatically apply itself to the facts of a case. So
the courts self-restrainedly formulate rules for construction, lest they
fall into the worse fault of hit-and-miss ad hoc interpretations. Those
rules are indeed numerous.' 9 Legislative intent, they say, is the principal
and primary consideration. Legislation must be construed with reference
to the times and situations of its enactment and the mischief it deals with.
W"Tords must be taken in their natural and obvious sense and all parts
of one statute or statutory scheme must be looked at as a whole. Spirit,
17.

Red Hook Cold Storage Co. v. Department of Labor, 295 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E2d 265

(1945).
18. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1946, c. 970.
19. See AcK. Statutes §§ 71-343. See also, McCaffrey, Statutory Interpretation (1953).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

purpose and effect are to be examined. Constructions are to be avoided
which produce objectionable, harsh, unreasonable, absurd, or unconstitutional consequences.
These rules or approaches are somewhat subjective as regards the
courts since they represent methods invented by one group (judicial) for
analyzing the intent of the other (legislative). In more recent years,
these canons of construction have, perhaps, lost popularity as against
the more objective tests based on legislative reports and debates and
messages from presidents and governors. Closely akin is the Brandeis
technique of examining the material, actually or presumptively used by
the legislature2 0 Judicial construction of statutes, however, is not and
by its nature cannot be scientific in method or result. Always we find
ourselves returning to the foremost of the numerous rules, that is, that
legislative intent and purpose is, when at all possible, to be found within
the four corners of the statute itself. This rule of construction (or rule
against construction) has served the New York courts well for at least
a century. In McCluskey v. Cromwell,2 in the very early years of the
Court of Appeals, New York's highest bench said this:
"It is, beyond question, the duty of courts, in construing statutes, to give effect to
the intent of the law-making power, and seek for that intent in every legitimate way.
But in the construction, both of statutes and contracts, the intent of the framers
and parties is to be sought, first of all, in the words and language employed, and if
the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and
distinctly, the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort
to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need
of interpretation, and when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture, in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes
and contracts should be read and understood according to the natural and most
obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction,
for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. Courts cannot
correct supposed errors, omissions or defects in legislation, or vary by construction,
the contracts of parties. The office of interpretation
is to bring sense out of the
22
words used, and not bring a sense into them."1

In Meltzer v. Koenigsberg,23 almost one hundred years later, the Court
of Appeals went, verbatim, all the way back to the McCluskey case to
restate its salutary warning.2 4 As Judge Cardozo wrote, statutes (absent
unconstitutionality, of course) do not, "to the extent that their commands
20. The usefulness in New York of this technique has been lessened in recent years by

the declining number of legislative and gubernatorial hearings on bils. As to its misuse by
some courts, see Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the
Court
21.
22.
23.
24.

Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948).
11 N.Y. 593 (1854).
Id. at 600-01.
302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1951).
See also, In the Matter of Rathscheck, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E.2d 887 (1950).
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are unmistakable,' 2 come within the jurisprudential ken at all. This is
true, as to the construction and interpretation of contracts and wills as
well. In the end there is no escape from this: judicial construction of
doubtful statutes, like every other kind of "law-making," involves and
includes some amount of policy making. The judiciary must be relied on
to remember that it represents the justice of the state, that other
branches represent its power. -0
CONCLUSION

The courts, as we have seen, are by judicial self-restraint kept on the
right side of the road, and "self-discipline and the voters"2 7 provide
similar restraints for the legislators, all without acrimony. There is a
lack of continuous liaison but an official nexus is supplied. Since 1934,
New York has had in the Law Revision Commission a "Ministry of
justice," a body charged by law with surveying the private substantive
law and recommending to the Legislature changes therein. The Commission considers itself to be "a mediator between courts and legislature,
no more, no less."" The Commission during those twenty years has
done much work in numerous fields,"' but it has its limitations, c9 and
of necessity leaves untouched more questions than it answers.
The functions and powers of the legislative and judicial branches of
government do, to a certain extent, overlap. But rather than produce
complete uncertainty or chaos, this "struggle" of the courts against the
legislature has produced a jurisprudence beneficial to our society.
25. Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science 9 (1928).
26. See remarks of William Evarts, delegate, in 3 Proceedings, N.Y. State Constitutional
Convention of 1S67, at 2367.
27. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
28. See MacDonald, Foreword to the Symposium, 40 Cornell L.Q. 641, 642 (195S).
29. See Symposium, 40 Cornell L.Q. 641-763 (1955).
30. See MacDonald, supra note 28, at 642-44.

